Why Investigate Moral Psychology?

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Why Investigate Moral Psychology?

Why moral pscyhology?

What led you here? Discuss with the person next to you. Most interesting answers on a post it, stick them on the board during the break.

Reason 1: it enables us to better understand human sociality

human sociality

Modern humans

but cooperate with non-kin.

This is perhaps a little controversial—I understand ‘Early ethnographers suggested that hunter-gatherer societies were primarily kin based’ implying that hunter–gatherers cooperate primarily among kin. However recent studies indicate that contemporary hunter–gatherer societies do cooperate among non-kin (Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012; Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014).

‘Although the Hadza have a preference for kin as both campmates and gift recipients (indicating a potential for kin selection), the Hadza also actively form many ties with non-kin. In fact, recent work examining co- residence patterns across hunter-gatherer societies suggests that first-order relatives make up less than 10% of residential camps, raising the question of how high levels of cooperation are maintained in groups of mostly unrelated individuals.’ (Apicella et al., 2012, p. 500)

‘Hadza networks are structured in a way that is consistent with the evolution of cooperative behaviour. Cooperators tend to be connected to cooperators at both the dyadic and network level, conditions necessary to sustain cooperation’ (Apicella et al., 2012, p. 500)

(~10 000 years ago, relative to the 100–300k years since they first appeared)

Why do humans do this?

obstacle: reciprocity and reputation are insufficient (e.g. Stibbard-Hawkes, Smith, & Apicella, 2022)

‘Theory suggests that neither kin selection nor reciprocity can easily be scaled up to account for large-scale social systems. This theoretical argument accords with the evidence. Kin selection results in large-scale social systems only when some mechanism exists to multiply the number of closely related individuals.’ (Richerson & Boyd, 1999, p. 256).

‘Humans are [...] adapted [...] to live in morally structured communities’ thanks in part to ‘the capacity to operate systems of moralistic punishment’ and susceptibility ‘to moral suasion’

(Richerson & Boyd, 1999, p. 257).

Richerson and Boyd, 1999 p. 257

Problem: Does not seem plausible that this can be adaption in the evolutionary sense.

Solution: Richerson & Boyd (1999) propose that it is a consequence of ‘cultural evolution’.

‘humans (both individually and as a species) develop morality because it is required for cooperative systems to flourish’

(Hamlin, 2015, p. 108)

We can what this might involve, in outline, by reflecting on something called ‘intuitive ethics’

rough hypothesis:

Ethical abilities explain,
in part at least,
why humans cooperate with non-kin
in ways that are adaptive.

Cuturually adaptive or evolutionarily adaptive—I’m not sure but possibly the more recent evidence on cooperation among non-kin in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies at least leaves open the possibility that it’s evolutionarily adaptive.

Important not to get the impression that humans are cooperative angels: they are also remarkable for the lack of nearby species (in comparison to other primates which have evolutionarily closer species).

300kya there were maybe maybe nine hominid species. Why all except one disappeared remains controversial, but it’s unlikely to be a climate event and more likely to have something to do with the humans.

That was human sociality: the idea was that investingating moral psychology is worthwhile because it enables us to better understand human sociality.

human sociality

political conflict,

Reason 2: it enables us to better understand one aspect of political conflict, and will perhaps even eventually suggest ways of overcoming some political conflicts.

Relatedly, moral psychology matters for understanding why political change is sometimes difficult; especially in democratic societies.

I can’t provide much support for this claim now, and, being philosophers, one of our questions will be whether it is true at all. But I think there is a reasonable case to be made for it.

The idea that moral psychology can help us to understand, and perhaps even to overcome, political divides comes out sharply in research on attitudes to climate change ...

Why are liberals generally more concerned about climate change than conservatives?

It is striking that liberals are generally more concerned about climate change than conservatives. But why should this be?

[error bars show SEM (or SE), Standard Error of Mean. (We aren’t going to use that in interpreting the figure; we’re not relying on the graph but on an interaction identified using a regression analysis).]

‘Simple-slopes analyses revealed that more liberal participants (1 SD below the mean) in the not-recycle condition rated the target as significantly less moral (M = 3.59) than did their liberal counterparts in either the recycle condition (M = 4.54), b = 0.95, p < .001, or the control condition (M = 4.31), b = 0.72, p < .001. We found no significant differences across conditions for more conser- vative participants (1 SD above the mean), ps > .15.’

‘participants read one of three vignettes describing an average day of a target individual. The vignettes were identical, describing a day’s activities for the target. The one difference was whether or not, after eating his lunch, the target chose to recycle his plastic water bottle (recycle condi- tion) or throw it away as garbage (not-recycle condition). In the control condition, there was no mention of this bottle. Participants then rated the target on how moral they perceived him to be overall on a scale from 1 (not moral at all) to 6 (extremely moral).’

So maybe the difference is that liberals are more likely to see climate change as an ethical issue than conservatives

This raises another question: Why are liberals more likely than conservatives to regard climate change as an ethical issue?

To answer this question, we need to think about cultural differences.

Recall the ‘intuitive ethics’ idea I mentioned earlier (and which we will critically consider in more depth later in the course).

‘intuitive ethics’ (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Atari et al., 2023)

harm/care

equality

proportionality

in-group loyalty

respect for authorty

purity, sanctity

One of the biggest cultural divides, ethically: liberals vs conservatives.

Typically when we think about cultural differences, we imagine contrasting a society like the US or UK with some very remote place, a place so remote and special that even knowing how to pronounce its name makes you feel special.

But one of the best studied cultural differences concerning ethics involves communities many of us move between every day: social conservatives and social liberals.

According to Haidt & Graham, ‘Conservatives have many moral concerns that liberals simply do not recognize as moral concerns.’ (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 99) (Broader issue: cultural variety in the boundaries of morality.)

In particular, liberals have an ethics in which only the first two really matter; they have removed the last three. Conservatives have all five ‘foundations’.

[*todo MOVE what follows]

It starts with observations about a cultural difference.

[Liberals: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity ‘On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral’]

[‘from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader ... ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily [ignoring these], and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.’ (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 98) (from the abstract)]

[‘Recognizing ingroup, authority, and purity as moral concerns—even if they are not your moral concerns—is crucial both for scientific accuracy and for the application of social justice research’ (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 111)]

[‘Conservatives and many moderates are opposed to gay marriage in part due to moral intuitions related to ingroup, authority, and purity, and these concerns should be addressed, rather than dismissed contemptuously.’ (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 112)]

This idea has been advanced by Markowitz & Shariff ...

Why are liberals generally more concerned about climate change than conservatives?

‘The moral framing of climate change has typically focused on only the first two values: harm to present and future generations and the unfairness of the distribution of burdens caused by climate change.

As a result, the justification for action on climate change holds less moral priority for conservatives than liberals’

(Markowitz & Shariff, 2012, p. 244)

Markowitz & Shariff, 2012 p. 244

Similarly, you can understand a bit about why nationalism tends to be associated with conservatives rather than liberals (although it varies from place to place).

Ok, that was the second reason for studying moral psychology: it may help us to understand an aspect of political conflict.

political conflict,

e.g. over climate change?

A third reason brings us closer to home. Not a few researchers in moral psychology have argued that their discoveries about the psychological underpinnings of moral abilities have consequences for ethics and metaethics.

[Reason 3: according to many researchers, discoveries in moral psychology undermine various claims that have been made by philosophers in ethics; they may also challenge some philosophical methods. (This is going to be controversial.)]

ethics?

Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support, ethical principles?

‘Hier sehen wir nun die Philosophie in der Tat auf einen mißlichen Standpunkt gestellt [...]

‘Here we see philosophy placed in a predicament,

Hier soll sie ihre Lauterkeit beweisen als Selbsthalterin ihrer Gesetze [...]

Here it should prove its integrity as self-sustainer of its own laws

Alles also, was empirisch ist, ist als Zutat zum Princip der Sittlichkeit nicht allein dazu ganz untauglich, sondern der Lauterkeit der Sitten selbst höchst nachteilig [...]

So everything empirical is, as a contribution to the principle of morality, not only entirely unfit for it, but even highly detrimental to the integrity of morals.

Wider diese Nachlässigkeit oder gar niedrige Denkungsart in Aufsuchung des Princips unter empirischen Bewegursachen und Gesetzen kann man auch nicht zu viel und zu oft Warnungen ergehen lassen,

Against this careless, base way of thinking one cannot warn too often or too strongly:

indem die menschliche Vernunft [...] gern [...] der Sittlichkeit einen aus Gliedern ganz verschiedener Abstammung zusammengeflickten Bastard unterschiebt, der allem ähnlich sieht [...], nur der Tugend nicht’

for human reason happily replaces morality with a bastard patched together from limbs of diverse ancestry which [...] looks nothing like virtue’ (loose translation adapted from Kant (2002, pp. 43--4)).

(Kant, 1870, p. AK 4:425--6)

Don’t say you weren’t warned kids.

No discernible argument.

Also, how can something be both patched together out of various limbs and also be conceived outside of wedlock? It’s really quite vulgar.

‘Here we see philosophy placed in a predicament, Here it should prove its integrity as self-sustainer of its own laws [...] So everything empirical is, as a contribution to the principle of morality, not only entirely unfit for it, but even highly detrimental to the integrity of morals. [...] Against this careless, base way of thinking one cannot warn too often or too strongly: for human reason happily replaces morality with a bastard patched together from limbs of diverse ancestry which [...] looks nothing like virtue’ (loose translation adapted from Kant (2002, pp. 43--4)).

Some claims made by moral psychologists.

Humans lack direct insight into moral properties

(Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010)

(Sinnott-Armstrong et al, 2010 p. 268).

Intuitions cannot be used to counterexample theories

(Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010)

(Sinnott-Armstrong et al, 2010 p. 269).

Intuitions are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations

(Greene, 2014, p. 715)

(Greene, 2014 p. 715).

‘Let us define unfamiliar* problems as ones with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience.’ (Greene, 2014, p. 714)

Philosophers, including Kant, do not use reason to figure out what is right or wrong, but ‘primarily to justify and organize their preexising intuitive conclusions’

(Greene, 2014, p. 718)

(Greene, 2014 p. 718).

So that was the third reason ...

ethics?

non-reason: it enables us to better shape our own, individual morality.

Comparison with linguistics changing how you communicate with words. Could happen, but not likely to be a good thing.

Also be aware that there is a high degree of uncertainty here. One of my friends, a professor in the US, has a course called ‘better living through cognitive science’. I think that is a mistake: there is too much uncertainty.

personal

You wouldn't get in a plane on the basis of theories defended by physicists: you rely on engineers and safety standards. And even then, few of us would want to be on the first flight a new type of plane made. We don’t yet have engineers of human moral psychology. Which is perhaps for the best.