Against Reflective Equilibrium

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Against Reflective Equilibrium

Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support,
ethical principles?

Phase 2

Identify general arguments against the use of intuitions in doing ethics.

Consider implications for Rawl’s method of
reflective equilibrium.

Phase 1

Find places where a particular philosopher’s ethical argument relies on an empirical claim, and where knowledge of this claim depends on scientific discoveries.

✓

What is reflective equilibrium?

Background: How do philosophers approach ethics? Rawls’ idea about reflective equilibrium captures a dominant strategy.

One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea

‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 41)

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. It looks like this will involve moral psychology. But actually Rawls has no such ambitions. He thinks that you can describe moral capacities by characterising the judgements people are inclined to make.

So my main point for now is just that one quite influential way of doing ethics leaves no room for discoveries about moral psychology.

[UPDATE: save this for lecture 09: MFT MEETS REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM; can give a bit more detail] But actually you can already see the outlines of an objection to reflective equilibrium:

Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a single consistent set of principles. Neither within an individual; nor between individuals from different cultures.

Background: How do philosophers do ethics?

There are many approaches, but let’s look at one influential candidate.

This is the encyclopedia

‘Reflective equilibrium is the dominant method in moral and political philosophy’

(Knight, 2023)

‘this method, properly understood, is [...] the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters [...]. Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent alternatives to it are illusory.’

(Scanlon, 2002, p. 149)

‘To most moral philosophers who reason about substantive moral issues, it seems that the method of reflective equilibrium, or a process very similar to it, is the best or most fruitful method of moral inquiry.

Of the known methods of inquiry, it is the one that seems most likely to lead to justified moral beliefs.

(McMahan, 2013, p. 111)

One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea

‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

Rawls (1999, p. 41)

(a) do you understand reflective equilibrium?

(b) Can you see an argumemt against it?

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.

Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.

Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support,
ethical principles?

Phase 2

Identify general arguments against the use of intuitions in doing ethics.

Consider implications for Rawl’s method of
reflective equilibrium.

Phase 1

Find places where a particular philosopher’s ethical argument relies on an empirical claim, and where knowledge of this claim depends on scientific discoveries.

Can be supportive rather than debunking. However, practically speaking, it’s easier to show that knowledge of the claim depends on scientific discoveries when the science contradicts the ethicist’s claim. (Otherwise it’s hard to show that the ethicist knew the claim was true all along.)

✓

Now we know what reflective equilibrium is.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. The moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

recall: speed vs accuracy trade-offs

Any broadly inferential process has to make a trade-off between speed and accuracy

wicked learning environments

‘When a person’s past experience is both representative of the situation relevant to the decision and supported by much valid feedback, trust the intuition; when it is not, be careful’

(Hogarth, 2010, p. 343).

Earlier I suggested that it’s clear that the cases philosophers study are unlikely to meet these criteria. They are interested in cases which are unusual and edge cases, so probably fit neither criterion (representative and feedback).

In the case of principles, I think it is unclear how we would establish whether past experience could be representative.

The thing about fast processes is that they gain speed by trading flexibility. So the principles that underpin them are supposed to be reliably correct in familiar cases only; any correctness beyond that is accidental.

You get feedback on cases, not principles.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. The moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

but where does this leave reflective equilibrium?

One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea

‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

Rawls (1999, p. 41)

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.

Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.

Dilemma for Rawls’ Reflective Equilibrium

Horn 1 : If you include not-justified-inferentially judgements about, or with implications for, unfamiliar* situations, you are not justified in starting there.

Horn 2 : If you include only not-justified-inferentially judgements about familiar* situations, you are not justified in generalising from them.

Because speed-accuracy trade off ...

amount to a generalisation of principles implicit in how fast processes handle familiar situations which allows us to apply those same principles in unfamiliar situations.

Reflective equilibrium might be interesting for all kinds of reasons (just as impetus mechanics is). But it is not a reliable method of discovering ethical truths.

Not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Reflective equilibrium ‘is [...] the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters [...]. Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent alternatives to it are illusory.’

(Scanlon, 2002, p. 149)

go to conclusion

image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d&view=detailv2&idpp=genimg&idpclose=1&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao&FORM=SYDBIC)

But are you sure that ethical intuitions can be wrong?

‘a theory of justice is [...] a theory [...] setting out the principles governing our moral powers’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 44)

I’m always interested to know who we are. Am I included? Are you?

Let’s suppose Rawls means living humans. (Not the history of our species, but also not just Rawls and his readers.)

Then it looks like there’s a sense in ethical intuitions cannot be wrong. This can be clarified by thinking about a comparison he draws ...

THis comes immediately after the initial stateement of reflective equilibrium

‘A useful comparison here is with the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of our native language. [footnote: Chomsky]’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 41)

Maybe also worth noting that some passages about grammar have been removed from the second edition.

Which comparison?

Ethics vs Physics

What does infallibility mean? 2. there is no interesting sense in which the principles governing the fast processes behind linguistic intuitions can be wrong. (Because there is nothing for them to answer to.)

3. In case #2 is too quick, we can say that they can be better or worse in enabling more or less sophisticated forms of communication (limits on the language of those who have been linguistically deprived in their early years, Senghas on profoundly deaf children of hearing parents etc); and they can match or fail to match those of others around us.

image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d&view=detailv2&idpp=genimg&idpclose=1&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao&FORM=SYDBIC)

But are you sure that ethical intuitions can be wrong?

And even if they can, does the loose reconstruction of Greene’s argument lead to a good objection to reflective equilibrium?

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Against Reflective Equilibrium

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