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Moral Disengagement: Significance

How, if at all, does a person’s reasoning influence their moral judgements?

In moral disengagement there is anticipation of self-inflicted punishment

which triggers reasoning

that influences moral judgements and actions.

One compelling reason for studying moral psychology is that ethical abilities appear to play a central role in atrocities
bandura notes that massive threats to human welfare stem mainly from deliberate acts of principle rather than unrestrained acts of impulse and he goes on to note and he develops essentially over several decades of work that those principles and their role in guiding the action seems to involve quite a significant role for reason

‘The massive threats to human welfare stem mainly from deliberate acts of principle, rather than from unrestrained acts of impulse’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 116).

‘If we ask people why they hold a particular moral view [their] reasons are often superficial and post hoc. If the reasons are successfully challenged, the moral judgment often remains.’

‘basic values are implemented in our psychology in a way that puts them outside certain practices of justification [...] basic values seem to be implemented in an emotional way’

(Prinz, 2007, p. 32).

no

An inconsistent dyad

1. moral reasoning characteristically follows moral judgement

‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).

We’ll come back to this in Part II of the course because this is a component of Moral Foundations Theory.

Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008 figure 4.1

[Figure corrected: earlier version had lower horizontal actions pointing the wrong way.]
‘Links 5 and 6 are hypothesized to occur rarely but should be of great interest to philosophers because they are used to solve dilemmas’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 188)
Social part is not relvant right now

An inconsistent dyad

1. moral reasoning characteristically follows moral judgement

‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).

2. moral reasoning sometimes enables a moral judgement which would otherwise be impossible

Moral reasoning can overcome (i) affective support for judgements about not harming and (ii) affective obstacles to deliberately harming others.

[UPDATE ∞todo: I’m not confident there really is a problem here. It looks like there is a problem. But Haidt et al allow that A’s reasoning can affect B’s intuitions and conversely; so it may be that (2) involves the social loop.]
[IF the UPDATE is right, could present the inconsistent dyad as apparent then introduce the loop diagram to explain how it might work.]
[UPDATE 2: Some of the Bandura cases are clearly intrapersonal, not interpersonal]
Further significance: We also have evidence for the 'sometimes' part

puzzle

Why are moral judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

Can strengthen this by considering moral disengagement.