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Introduction to Lecture 3: Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgement

 

Lecture 03

Moral Psychology

preview of lecture: a new puzzle

puzzle

Why are moral judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

intution ≠ judgement

An intuition is a claim that you accept independently of any inferential justification for it.
A judgement is just a claim that you accept. (So intuitions are judgements but not conversely.)

start of lecture

How, if at all, does a person’s reasoning influence their moral judgements?

‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).

‘If we ask people why they hold a particular moral view [their] reasons are often superficial and post hoc. [...] basic values are implemented in our psychology in a way that puts them outside certain practices of justification’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 32).

emotion

-> judgement

-> reasoning

nb: the judgement is initially an intuition but may lose that status after reasoning has occurred (depending on whether your accepting the claim is now dependent on your having inferential justification for it).

evidence?