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Conclusion: Guesses Aren’t Evidence

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

Which comparison?

Ethics vs Physics

Not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

‘When I have an intuition it seems to me that something is the case, and so I am defeasibly justified in believing that things are as they appear to me to be. That fact [...] opens the door to the possibility of moral knowledge.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 167)

1. ‘If I have the intuition that P, then [...] my belief that P [...] will be justified [until such time (a time which may never come) as] I find reason to reject it.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 166)

2. ‘what it is to confirm an intuition:

checking it against other intuitions to see if they harmonize in the appropriate ways.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 172)

Aside: compare Rawls’ on reflective equilibrium

The sceptic needs to show there is ‘something especially problematic about moral intuitions, as distinct from others.’

(Kagan, 2023, p. 170)

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 41)

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. It looks like this will involve moral psychology. But actually Rawls has no such ambitions. He thinks that you can describe moral capacities by characterising the judgements people are inclined to make.
So my main point for now is just that one quite influential way of doing ethics leaves no room for discoveries about moral psychology.
But actually you can already see the outlines of an objection to reflective equilibrium:
Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a single consistent set of principles. Neither within an individual; nor between individuals from different cultures.
I will just leave you with the argument we have been studying today.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. The moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.